Soldier's Pen
By BGen. Alexander Cabales (Ret.)
The insurgency phenomenon
Most senior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) today has indicated preference in taking further studies
fields aside from those which are directly related to their martial
profession. This was the finding of an
unidentified author of an article published for the magazine of the Philippine
Air Force (PAF) in July 1, this year.
The author went on by tacitly criticizing the organization which he
alleged has already neglected the study of military strategy and history in favor of other subjects.
The highest training program for the officers of the AFP is the
Command and General Staff Course (CGSC).
This course prepares senior officers for 'generalship.' However, through the years, the organization
realized that this course is wanting and do not fully equip our generals with
the capacity to cope with and solve our peculiar type of insurgency. Moreover, this program, being just a copy of
foreign CGSC courses, is designed for conventional types of warfare. Addressing our internal insurgency as we all
know is not a conventional one.
The military learned its lessons the hard way in protracted
battles with different groups that threaten the security of our nation with the
use of force and military might. It has
learned that insurgency is a never ending cycle in areas where its root causes
were not addressed properly.
The military then goes back to the same area it has already
pacified a decade or so ago; conducts renewed operation, succeeds in
neutralizing the 'enemy' again, and then moves on to another troubled spot to
do the same type of military campaign.
In another decade or so, it returns to the same area to repeat the same
cycle. Along the way, lives and limbs were wasted, properties destroyed or
abandoned, and development is stunted. A
very good example is the Island of Samar which I had the opportunity to observe
very closely in four separate stints as a soldier.
The traditional soldier was trained to fight the 'enemies' of
the state with the use of arms. History
tells us that the AFP has creditably performed its job along this line. Despite its numerous victories though, it has
not won the war against insurgency. When
everything seems to have been won, when the armed clashes stop and the
insurgent forces already spent, the military ends its campaign. In a few years, however, a stronger and a
better organized insurgent force rises again to haunt our government anew. This prompted the military to do his homework
and make an in-depth study of this phenomenon.
In the study of insurgency, we liken it to a tree whose roots
are buried deep underneath the earth. We
may succeed in chopping off the tree but given the same conditions in which it
grew, it will strive again. Thus the
military cuts off the insurgency tree, the part that is visible to the human
eye but it fails to destroy its roots.
In a short while, it grows again in the same fertile soil of
discontent. It was in that area that the
military failed - eradicating the root causes of rebellion.
Addressing the social ills is not the forte of the
military. Hence, the AFP proposed a
'wholistic' approach of four phases called the CHCD
(Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop) Methodology.
In the first phase, the AFP CLEARS (conducts combat operations)
insurgent infested areas to neutralize the armed component of the insurgent
force.
When it is done, it HOLDS on the said area by organizing the
village defense system (CAFGU) and empowers the barangay leaders thus
dismantling the insurgent 'shadow government.'
In the third and fourth phases, CONSOLIDATE and DEVELOP, respectively,
the regular government agencies come in to study the needs of the people in the
barangay, plan their courses of action, then implement development
programs.
Following strictly the CHCD was difficult. There was always a lack of understanding on
the part of the civilian government implementers due to the changes in
leadership every three years thus preventing continuity of efforts. The intent, purpose, selection and
deployment of CAFGUs were not followed.
It was treated as a livelihood program, marred with a patronage system
by the barangay leaders and the local executives. They're used as private
armies or security to local leaders and prominent businessmen.
Moreover, most line agencies of the government cannot cope with
their mandate either due to lack of appreciation on its importance, limited
resources, and the absence of the needed push from the local executives or from
their mother agencies. Some local
government executives also do not follow this phasing and instead put their
projects in other areas that support their political agenda.
Based on their experiences in the field, the new AFP soldier
has multi-tasked himself especially in areas where the government is hardly
felt. In the remote areas, he becomes
the teacher through the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS), the only doctor
through its medical corps and the regular medical aide man in every unit, the
builder of roads and bridges and other infrastructures through the Engineer
Brigades and Engineer Detachments of infantry units. He provides religious services through its
military chaplain. He becomes the
policeman settling disputes, acting as security in village social activities
and even in apprehending criminals. He becomes
a community and cooperative organizer and leader, an entertainer of sorts
through its military band and combo, free movies and the conduct of
entertainment programs, and a social welfare agency. In most cases, the military detachment is the
only government agency that exists in many remote areas. He becomes a 'Jack of all trades' because the
situation calls for it.
Of course their services cannot fully substitute for what the
regular agency can provide. It merely
provides a stop gap measure. The AFP still hopes that its counterparts, the
civilian agencies in government, will see the total picture and actively
provide the non-military solution to the more than four decades of insurgency.
Meanwhile, the AFP encourages its personnel to venture into
non-military fields in order to have a better understanding of the needs of the
Filipino people and enable itself to cope with its contemporary role in nation
building and development. Our soldiers
now go into other fields such as engineering, urban planning, agriculture,
social welfare, business economics, strategic management and political history,
among others. Its exposure to other
fields of endeavor has widened the horizon of the military top leadership and
makes them better prepared in crafting strategies that interconnect, support
and supplement those of the other agencies of government.
The Filipino soldier of today is not only prepared for war but
also has a deeper understanding of the anatomy of our internal conflict and is
truly aware how it can be addressed. The
solution though, is not entirely in their hands.
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