Soldier's Pen
By BGen. Alexander Cabales (Ret.)
And he played with a scalpel
In a previous article we likened the Mama Sapano operation to that of a surgical operation, a medical term involving an incision using special instruments performed by a well-trained doctor in order to repair damage or arrest disease in a living body.
We also likened the Special Action Force (SAF) to a scalpel, a sharp instrument that can make precise and neat cuts. This instrument made of the best metal and created for a special purpose has to be wielded in the hands of an experienced surgeon. Further we said that in the hands of a monkey, the scalpel can do more damage and can kill the patient instead.
Accordingly, there were several errors that were committed as gleaned from the various investigations, inquiries and discussions on the infamous “Operation Exodus” that claimed the lives of 44 members of an elite unit of the Philippine National Police.
Normally, an operation involving a high level target such as that of international terrorist, Zulkifli Bin Hir alyas “Marwan” involves three levels of plans, decisions and actions – strategic, operational and tactical.
The strategic level is reserved only for the Chief Executive with the help of his cabinet members and advisers. Strategic activities are those that have socio-cultural, economic, political, diplomatic and military dimensions. These different dimensions always affect one another. Hence, they are wider in scope and have long range effects or impacts on the wellbeing and stability of the nation. These activities directly or indirectly support our national aims and objectives.
The decision to neutralize Marwan at that point in time was a strategic one. While the direct action was basically military or police in nature, it had some socio-cultural, political, diplomatic, and economic dynamics. It affected some national and international concerns and answer some important questions such as:
1) Will it bolster our claim that the Philippines strongly supports the war against international terrorism and will it satisfy the expectations of our allies (such as the US)? 2) Will it contribute to the peace and order condition in Mindanao and hasten foreign and local investments in the area? 3) How will it affect our fragile peace initiatives with the MILF and future ones with other groups or organizations that threaten the security of our country?
The issue of coordinating with the MILF is definitely a strategic one (and could not be blamed on P/Dir Getulio Napeñas who is only on the tactical level). Aside from the other local non-military concerns as an effect of the operations, it may also have some diplomatic repercussions.
Other countries, such as Malaysia that brokered the peace efforts, may feel that such surreptitious action in MILF ‘territory’ would create distrust between the government and the MILF and therefore runs counter to the confidence-building measures that Malaysia was so interested about.
On the other hand, coordinating (asking permission is perhaps the proper term) with the MILF will project an image that the Philippines does not have sovereignty in these areas and may be used as a basis for the MILF to seek for a ‘belligerency’ status from an international body.
The Secretaries of the DILG and DND are part of the strategic group being the alter egos and chief advisers of the President on peace and order matters. They also serve as the bridge between the strategic and operational levels and hence are also part of the operational side of the undertaking. Yet they were not consulted nor asked to contribute in the planning of the operation. The suspended PNP Chief is obviously not a part of the strategic group. However, if he was not suspended, he may be called upon to give operational inputs needed for strategic planning.
The operational level supports the strategic initiative and is meant to ‘operationalize’ the strategic decision. The operational plans, decisions and actions conform to that of the strategic. Although these may be in general terms, they give more substance and provide additional guidelines. The Secretaries of DILG and the DND; the Chief, PNP his major units; and the Chief of Staff, AFP and his major units are part of the operational group. The plans, decisions and actions in this level determine how the operation may be conducted; which units of the AFP and the PNP or civilian agencies may be involved; and the support systems that may be necessary to perform them. They also make the necessary coordination with other national agencies of government such as the DSWD and the DOH.
The lowest level in the hierarchy is the tactical side. This is where Napeñas comes in. His unit was tasked to accomplish the job and to perform the actual operations in accordance with the plan dictated from the top. However, situations vary and are sometimes even totally different on the ground than what was in the plan. As such, the tactical commander may implement situation dictated actions; or improvise those that were earlier planned and anticipated; or even abort the mission.
In extreme situations, the ground commander even violates operational guidelines if in his wisdom this is necessary to accomplish the mission or ensure the safety of his men. Thus, a good tactical commander is one who knows how to balance his two primary duties – to accomplish the mission and to look after the welfare of his men. Being the man on the ground, he is the best person to know the most effective course of action to take if it is not specifically mentioned in the plan. However, he may be forced to comply with a strategic directive even it defies all operational and tactical sanity.
Failures or successes are always determined at the end of a mission. If it succeeds, everybody claims that it was his or that he was a part of it. If it fails, nobody takes the blame. Sadly, it is always the tactical commander that is blamed for blunders on the ground even if he just followed the ‘beautiful’ plan laid out on a piece of paper by swivel chair commanders who have never had any experience in the field. Seasoned and wise leaders spend more time in the planning of important undertakings.
He makes sure that the right persons are consulted; the necessary data are gathered and meticulously evaluated and the preliminary and supporting activities are performed before the main and more important operation is undertaken. Most often, a good plan ensures the success of a mission.
Napeñas may have committed some tactical errors which are unexplainable being a seasoned combat officer. He did not abort the mission when his blocking force failed to occupy its designated position on time. His troops tarried on in the area, amongst a corn field (a tactically unsafe position) when they could have hastily withdrawn after killing Marwan. He did not (or failed to) employ as reinforcement his more than 300 elite forces located at the nearby highway.
It is hard to understand why these basic ‘errors’ were committed knowing him to be an experienced SAF operator. One may only speculate that he was made to do these tactically unsound decisions for more ‘strategic’ intentions.
A monkey played with a scalpel and he would not admit it even if blood showed in his hands.
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