NewsRecord Weekly Publication

Soldier’s Pen
By BGen. Alexander Cabales (Ret.)

Mama Sapano: 

a surgical operation

In the early phase of the inquiries involving the Mama Sapano debacle, one senior PNP officer said that the SAF (Special Action Force) operation against international terrorist, Zulkifli Bin Hiralyas, aka “Marwan,” was a “surgical operation” of sorts.  Few people might have picked up the term that he used as he didn’t bother to explain it at all.

“Surgical operation” is a medical term involving an incision using special instruments performed by a well-trained doctor in order to repair damage or arrest disease in a living body. As a general rule, it involves the cutting of a patient’s tissues or closure of a previously sustained wound.  It is an invasive procedure - one that penetrates or breaks the skin or enters a body cavity.
Marwan was a high value target, who, for several, has years evaded the normal “search and destroy” type of military or police operations.  He has lived amongst the MILF and BIFF communities since 2003 and several attempts to capture him failed for various reasons.
Many say that he was being coddled (to say it mildly) by the MILF with whom the Philippine government is forging a peace pact.  Hence, there was a need to conduct invasive actions. This kind of operation which is always characterized by element of surprise, lethal and precise execution, and timely and speedy conduct of the operations, was meant to be isolated from the provisions of the peace agreement being a legitimate law enforcement function.
Most of the previous operations against Marwan failed mainly because he was forewarned thus allowing him to evade the military or police forces.  Surprise therefore is a key element to the success of the mission.The enemy should not know of your plan so that he could not prepare accordingly. Even friendly forces or agencies may be left in the dark in order to avoid information leaks.  This explains why the SAF did not inform the AFP of the impending operations because their participation was felt to be unnecessary at that time.   The application of the “need to know” principle on the other agencies and the MILF as well was meant for the same reason.  Foremost, however, was to deny Marwan with the usual mass base support from the community around him.  In the case of the Mama Sapano operations, the SAF surprised Marwan and his security personnel and they were able to get him.
Just like in a medical surgical operation, the SAF had advanced information of the target, its operational environment and other conditions or factors that may affect his courses of action.  Thus the act of neutralizing Marwan was very deliberate, lethal and precise. They were able to contain the action to a small and specific area without disturbing the nearby villages at first.  However, they tarried in the vicinity after accomplishing their mission which should not have been the case.
The swiftness in which Marwan was neutralized may have been in accordance with the SAF time table.  The succeeding sequence of actions after completing their mission, however, was not.  Ideally, they could have vacated the area as fast as they came in.  And before the enemy forces became aware of their invasive action, they would have long been gone.  Yet, we learned that the assaulting and the blocking elements of the SAF did not vacate the area immediately after completing their mission.  They tarried and even had breakfast (of chocolates as reported) in the vicinity of the action.  This allowed the MILF and the BIFF to react and the rest was history.
There are three errors that I have seen that may have been forced on the SAF perhaps much against their tactical judgments.  First, the SAF assaulting element proceeded with the operations even if their blocking forces were not yet in their designated areas.  This condition makes them vulnerable to enemy maneuvers and counter attacks. Normally, that condition would have been a reason to abort the operation but they did not.  Were they told to go ahead despite this?  Why was there an urgency to complete the mission on that specific time frame?  Was it part of an unfolding greater political scenario?
The second possible error was why did they linger on in the area near the initial encounter site inside a corn field when their tactical doctrine tells them it is an unsafe position?  Where they told to stay put to act as a security force for the arrival of an important personality?  Was the corn field meant to be a helipad?
The third was about the role of the more than 300 SAF personnel near the highway some three to four kilometers away.  Why didn’t they reinforce their beleaguered comrades when they learned that they were out-maneuvered and massacred like chickens?  Were they really meant to be the reserve force?  Why so big a “reserve” force when military doctrine says that the main force (assaulting) should have priority of forces, followed by the supporting/blocking force and the reserve last?
Normally, the reserve force is less than or at most equal to the main effort.  In this case, the main force was only less than 40 personnel and the blocking force about the same number. Were they ordered not to reinforce in order not to escalate the hostilities and “preserve” the government peace initiatives?  Were the 300 SAF elements who were not engaged prepositioned as security forces in anticipation of the arrival of a VIP in the area?
We really do not know the answers as to why the SAF committed these blunders.  All that we can do is to speculate.
The SAF is like the scalpel, a sharp instrument that can make precise and neat cuts where they are needed in order to remove or cure the sick part of the patient without unnecessarily tearing his healthy and unaffected flesh.  This instrument made of the best metal and created for a special purpose has to be wielded by an experienced surgeon.  In the hands of a monkey, the scalpel can do more damage and can kill the patient instead.